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Abstract 
The paper draws upon empirical insights provided by a two-year research project relating to 
security governance at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and Austria 
(Euro 2008). The objective is to study the role and modalities of border and access control in the 
context of sport mega-event security on various national and urban scales. This investigation 
seeks to demonstrate that security and surveillance at sport mega-events are shaped, 
fundamentally, by efforts towards the increased flexibility, variability and mobility (in both space 
and time) of carefully orchestrated access, passage and border controls. At stake in this “mobile 
border assemblage” are a large variety of phenomena, places and scales: from classic border 
controls at the national boundaries to a wide range of inter- and intra-urban enclosures and 
passage points (Graham, 2010) aimed at monitoring, restricting, filtering and also managing and 
facilitating different forms and modalities of circulation (of people and objects). This paper explores 
the reasons, logics and characteristics of this phenomenon. 
Following Michel Foucaultʼs conceptual distinction between (apparatuses of) “discipline” and 
“security” (Foucault, 2009), the paper also aims to bring to the fore a number of more fundamental 
insights into the spatialities of contemporary security and surveillance. Two key issues stand out: 
firstly, the complex challenges associated with the necessary balancing and reconciliation of the 
core requirements of mobility and surveillance in contemporary security governance, and secondly, 
the multi-scalar, public-private interests and forms of expertise associated with this phenomenon. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, security governance at sport mega-events has been undergoing profound change, 
notably in terms of costs, personnel and surveillance technologies, as well as the rising influence of 
transnational, public-private partnerships and perceived security threats (political violence, 
hooliganism and terrorism in particular) (Samatas 2007; Haggerty and Boyle 2009; Yu, Klauser 
and Chan 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). This paper explores a very specific take on this 
subject. 
My broad aim is to study the role and modalities of border and access control in the context of 
sport mega-event security on different national and urban scales. More specifically, I seek to 
demonstrate that security and surveillance at sport mega-events are shaped, fundamentally, by 
efforts towards the increased flexibility, variability and mobility (in both space and time) of carefully 
orchestrated access, passage and border controls. This paper aims to investigate the reasons, 
logics, characteristics and socio-spatial implications of this phenomenon. 
To do so, the paper draws upon empirical insights provided by a two-year research project relating 
to security governance at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and Austria 
(Euro 2008). Facilitated by longstanding research collaboration, the project involved ten in-depth 
interviews with stakeholders in the policing of Euro 2008 in the Swiss city of Geneva. These 
included the security coordinator of the Euro 2008 stadium in Geneva, security personnel at 
Geneva International Airport, representatives from the Ministry of Justice in Geneva, the cityʼs 
security coordinator and police ground personnel. Furthermore, the research relied on the 
extensive study of official documents (minutes of local executive and parliament sittings, executive 
responses to local, regional and national parliamentary interpellations, and official documents from 
police sources and UEFA) and on information gathered from local, national and international media 
articles. 
 
2. APPROACH 
The paper is divided into three main parts. Firstly, I discuss four main reasons for which issues of 
border control are of special importance for sport mega-event security and, in turn, for which the 
mega-event case study has special appeal for the purpose of addressing contemporary border 
developments. This will then lead on to parts two and three of the paper, which are concerned with 
the spatial and temporal flexibility and variability of border and access control at Euro 2008. My 
central thesis is that mega-event security relies on a wide range of efforts to create a temporally 
and spatially dynamic patchwork of access and passage control points aimed at monitoring, 
restricting and filtering as well as managing and facilitating different forms and modalities of 
circulation (of people and objects) across the host nation and host cities of the event. At stake in 
this “mobile border assemblage” are a large variety of phenomena, places and scales, from classic 
border controls to a multiplicity of intra-urban enclosures and passage points (Graham 2010). 
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This paper does not attempt to provide an exhaustive overview of this topic, but proposes an 
exploratory analysis of select aspects of mobile borders in the context of Euro 2008, situated on 
two main scales: the host nations (1) and the host cities (2) of the tournament. This approach also 
aims to bring to the fore a number of more fundamental insights in contemporary security 
governance. Two key issues stand out: firstly, the complex challenges associated with the 
necessary balancing and reconciliation of the core requirements of mobility and surveillance, 
circulation and enclosure in contemporary security governance; and secondly, the multi-scalar, 
public-private collaboration and interests associated with this phenomenon. 
 
2.1. Interplays of surveillance, bordering and mobility 
The complex interplay of surveillance, bordering and mobility in the post 9/11 context has sparked 
a revealing literature over the last few years (Albert and Jacobsen 2001; Bigo 2003; Walters 2004; 
Zureik and Salter 2005; Amoore 2008; Côté-Boucher 2008). One of the key lessons deriving from 
the literature is that the distinction between inter-state border control and the monitoring of more 
diffuse access and passage points across the national and urban territory is increasingly blurred 
from a spatial, functional, technological and organisational viewpoint, and therefore quite relative 
(Graham 2010). 
Recent developments towards so-called “smart” or “biometric” borders, for example, enable much 
more flexible and mobile forms of policing of trans- and intra-national circulations of people and 
objects (Amoore 2008). Yet besides their state and policing applications, novel control, filtering and 
identification techniques are also increasingly used in private places, and for private purposes, 
from RFID chips in tickets to fingerprint identification and face recognition for access control to 
buildings and larger spatial enclaves. 
In this emerging system of connections and separations, there are yet still myriads of other places 
and sites, based on more sporadic and permeable access control, separating more or less purified 
“insides” from more or less dangerous “outsides” (Franzen 2001:207). Examples range from gated 
communities (Connell 1999) to shopping malls (Benton-Short 2007) and from airports (Adey 2004; 
Salter 2008) and other highly secured transport hubs to recreational facilities, leisure spaces and 
bunkered private homes (Klauser 2010). 
In this context of ever more generalised types and logics of access and passage controls, “the 
contemporary border is constituted as much by data-flows, artificial zones and spaces of enclosure 
that seep into the city and the neighbourhood, as by older state and geographic boundaries” 
(Amoore, Marmura and Salter 2008:96). As Graham argues, “borders cease to be geographical 
lines and filters between states (always an over-simplified idea) and emerge instead as 
increasingly interoperable assemblages of control technologies strung out across the worldʼs 
infrastructures, circulations, cities and bodies” (Graham 2010:132). 
In this paper, my aim is to address this problematic through the lens of sport mega-event security. 
In view of this analysis, two main conceptual tools will first be introduced. 
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2.2. Discipline and security 
My investigation draws heavily upon Michel Foucaultʼs distinction between (apparatuses of) 
“discipline” and “security” (Foucault 2009). With the help of these conceptual tools, Foucault 
distinguishes between two types – or “arts” (Foucault 2009:92) – of governing, i.e. between two 
“economies of power” (Foucault 2009:11) shaping, and shaped by, different sets of relationships 
and procedures for organising and regulating the two fundamental objects of government: 
population and territory. Foucault, in sum, proposes a “history of governmentality” (Foucault 
2009:247) concerned with the question of how governing relates to its two main objects and 
“resources”. 
Apparatuses of “discipline” and of “security”, for Foucault, differ in multiple ways and on multiple 
levels: in terms of their treatment of the uncertain, their relationship to normalisation, their specific 
procedures and techniques of power and, perhaps most interestingly, their spatial logics and 
articulations. For Foucault, the purpose of discipline is the “constitution of an empty, closed space 
within which artificial multiplicities are to be constructed and organized” (Foucault 2009:17). The 
functioning of discipline thus relies on spatial enclosure, isolation and segmentation in order to 
impose a predefined model of normativity. 
“Discipline, of course, analyzes and breaks down; it breaks down individuals, places, 
movements, actions, and operations. […] Second, discipline classifies the components thus 
identified according to definite objectives. […] Third, discipline establishes optimal sequences 
or co-ordinations. […] Fourth, discipline fixes the process of progressive training and 
permanent control, and finally, on the basis of this, it establishes the division between those 
considered unsuitable or incapable and the others. […] Disciplinary normalisation consists 
first of all in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, 
and the operation of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, movements, 
and actions to conform to this model (Foucault 2009:56-57). 
In contrast, the aim of “security”, for Foucault, is to “let things happen”, whilst also regulating and 
monitoring them (Foucault 2009:41). The limit of the acceptable is not merely conditioned by a 
binary opposition between the permitted and the prohibited, but adapted gradually to a given 
reality, in function of careful calculations and through complex procedures. Here reality is 
approached from a techno-scientific viewpoint as an ensemble of intelligible and manageable 
entities and conditions of governing. The question at stake is how to know, to regulate and to act 
upon this reality within a “multivalent and transformable framework” (Foucault 2009:20). In this 
view, techniques of information gathering and analysis are, of course, of fundamental importance. 
“Surveillant assemblages” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) and databases, for the purposes of 
calculation, simulation and anticipation, are the very basis and means of Foucauldian “security”. 
The spatial logic of “security”, thus, is not one of enclosure, fixity and isolation, but one of 
circulation. “Spaces of security” respond to the need to regulate, optimise and manage flows. 
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“The problem is not only that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing 
circulations to take place, of controlling them, shifting the good and the bad, ensuring that 
things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point 
to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out 
(Foucault 2009:65). 
In this paper, Foucaultʼs distinction between “discipline” and “security” will be mobilised to 
interrogate the intertwined spatial and functional logics of access and passage controls at Euro 
2008. I will show that logics of “discipline” and of “security” were present in combination at Euro 
2008, underpinning and shaping the efforts towards increased flexibility and mobility of the 
complex border assemblages at the tournament. 
 
3. THE BORDER PROBLEMATIC IN SPORT MEGA-EVENT 
SECURITY 
By way of introduction, four main characteristics of the border problematic associated with sport 
mega-event security need highlighting. This discussion also underscores the importance and key 
challenges of border control in the context of sport mega-events both on the inter- and intra-state 
level. 
 
3.1. Issues of circulation in mega-event security 
The expansion of sport mega-events into globalised media spectacles has dramatically increased 
the economic significance of the tournaments. Yet as the events have expanded, and especially 
since 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, the increased transnational significance of mega-
events has also resulted in dramatically reinforced security efforts (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). 
Security expenditure for the 2004 Athens Olympics amounted to £0.7 billion, more than double that 
for the 2000 Sydney games (Samatas 2007), and recent cost estimates for security arrangements 
at the forthcoming 2012 London Olympics approach £1 billion, a figure which is likely to increase 
further (Magnay 2010). 
At the core of this cost explosion lies a deep concern with the threats posed by terrorism, political 
violence and hooliganism (Jennings and Lodge 2009). Despite the fundamental differences 
between these three types of risk, they share some common features, which shape the security 
efforts surrounding contemporary sport mega-events. Three of these features are particularly 
important from a border perspective. 
• Firstly, terrorism, political violence and hooliganism are, fundamentally, trans-scalar in nature 
and implication. The risks they pose, their origins, their characteristics and manifestations, as 
well as their policing, depend on and bring together local, national and transnational 
components, issues and actors (Bigo 2003). 
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• Secondly, and building upon the first point, terrorism, political violence and hooliganism are all 
connected in important ways with issues of mobility. Recent terrorist attacks in New York (11 
September 2001), Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) focused on, and worked 
through, inter- and intra-urban mobility systems (trains, buses, aeroplanes). Political violence 
and hooliganism are linked with mobility, in that (1) mobility systems enable and shape their 
development and current globalisation; (2) mobility systems are often affected by both kinds of 
risks; and (3) mobility systems are at the very core of current policing efforts directed at 
political violence and hooliganism (travel restrictions, filtering of international mobilities, etc.).  
• Thirdly, monitoring and combating terrorism, hooliganism and political violence at sport mega-
events occurs in the same context of increased density, diversity and visibility (media 
exposure). 
Thus all three types of risk raise the same dilemma for mega-event security: how to keep the host 
nationʼs borders open and cities moving whilst also anticipating, monitoring and combating the 
security threats at the tournament. At the interface of two apparently opposed worlds – the 
necessary entrance and circulation of visitors, spectators and officials, and the institution of 
security measures and restrictions – the basic problem is how to manage and secure increased 
scales and densities of circulation within a context of heightened risks, density, diversity and media 
exposure. Security issues, in this context, are addressed by a set of practices and techniques 
whose key challenge is to balance the demands for mobility and enclosure. This challenge – 
essentially a problem of how to articulate “security” and “discipline” in Foucaultʼs terms – is of 
course not exclusive to sport mega-events (Aas 2005; Amoore 2006). However, it is of heightened 
relevance in this context because of the eventʼs scale and special characteristics. Relevant 
questions are: 
• How are the core requirements of mobility and security, circulation and surveillance balanced 
in the context of sport mega-events?  
• How do emerging geographies of surveillance and security at sport mega-events work to align 
different types of circulation with identification, verification and authentication controls?  
• How do the practices and techniques of surveillance – as means and tools of mobility 
governance – engage with the key infrastructural networks that aim to keep people moving 
through and between cities?  
The basic assumption of this paper is that it is precisely to these questions that efforts towards 
increased border flexibility, variability and mobility aim to respond. 
 
3.2. Multi-scalar (local-national-transnational) security cooperation 
Sport mega-events provide not only an exemplary illustration of the intertwined local, national and 
transnational origins, modalities and implications of risks and security threats, but also of the multi-
scalar functioning and logics of security partnerships, information exchange, norms and 
agreements. A few examples taken from Euro 2008 in Switzerland provide a flavour thereof. 
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• In 1990, Switzerland ratified the “European Convention on Spectator Violence and 
Misbehaviour at Sporting Events” (Council of Europe Convention SR0.415.3), promoting the 
exchange of information and police cooperation for sport events. For Euro 2008, Switzerland 
also concluded a range of additional ad hoc agreements with neighbouring, transit and 
participating countries. Interestingly, several agreements written up for earlier events were 
used again for Euro 2008 (examples include the international treaty for air defence with 
France, signed at the occasion of the 2003 G8 summit in Evian near Geneva, and the air 
defence agreement with Italy, established for the 2004 Turin Winter Olympics). This 
observation resonates with those literatures that describe sport mega-events as catalysts in 
setting off longer-lasting international security collaborations (Chan 2002). 
• As was the case during the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the Euro 2008 host cities ensured that 
foreign fan groups were accompanied by police and fan monitors from their own countries. In 
addition, Switzerland asked France and Germany to supply up to 1,000 police officers (a total 
of 5,250 working days) to increase its police contingent for Euro 2008 (Projektorganisation 
Öffentliche Hand 2008a:50). 
• Finally, it is important to acknowledge the strong collaboration between public security 
authorities and Euro 2008 SA, a subsidiary company of UEFA and the official organiser of the 
event. Indeed, security in stadia and official UEFA fan zones was mandated to Euro 2008 SA, 
who decided to implement the task by contracting private security companies (Public 
Authorities Security Sector Coordination 2007:47). In studying cross-border cooperation in 
security governance at sport mega-events, therefore, it is also necessary to consider the 
important roles played by the event organisers (UEFA, FIFA, IOC, etc.) and private security 
companies. 
The examples cited above provide a good starting point for considering the multiple partnerships 
and agreements linking together local, national and international security stakeholders at Euro 
2008. As privileged loci where transnationally operating security players meet with locally anchored 
stakeholders, sport mega-events exemplify the cross-scalar interdependences present in 
contemporary security governance. Thus the border problem at sport mega-events is not only how 
to filter, monitor and, if necessary, restrict different types of circulations, but also how to set up 
efficient security governance across different national, regional and local (institutional, legal, 
political, linguistic, etc.) contexts and separations. The two questions are intrinsically related, since 
efforts towards the increased flexibility and mobility of border controls at Euro 2008 indeed relied 
on carefully orchestrated trans-scalar security collaboration and exchange. 
 
3.3. Circulating events and best-practices 
A third border issue associated with sport mega-event security is related to the eventsʼ own 
circulation from nation to nation and city to city. This raises an important question with regard to 
how relevant expertise and best-practice models circulate transnationally across different types of 
borders (political, socio-cultural, linguistic, etc.). 
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As I have emphasised elsewhere (Klauser 2011a; 2011b), there are many good reasons for 
understanding sport mega-events as highly visible and prestigious projects whose securitisation is 
firmly embedded in more or less coercive transnational circuits of imitation and standardisation. 
This issue is not at the core of the present paper, but it is nonetheless vital for an understanding of 
the origins and development of the cross-border collaborations and transnational “mobile border 
assemblages” underpinning event security. 
 
3.4. Exceptionality of the event 
In the context of sport mega-events, some of the most important trans-scalar and mobility-related 
issues concerning contemporary security become crystallised in a specific set of layered national 
and urban geographies. The exceptionality of the event increases the weight and perceived 
importance of particular security projects undertaken for the event, whilst at the same time 
decreasing the scope for criticism and opposition (Tomlinson 2009). Thus mega-events trigger and 
facilitate projects and developments which would not otherwise have been possible; Euro 2008 
made no exception to this (Klauser 2011c). 
Many of the special security preparations, efforts and investments for constructional measures, 
surveillance technologies, novel legislation and security partnerships for Euro 2008 conveyed an 
explicit border dimension. This can be seen, for example, in the aforementioned cross-border 
collaboration agreements with neighbouring countries, in special visa regulations and in novel 
mobile fingerprint identification devices (these examples are discussed in more detail below). The 
scale and exceptionality of Euro 2008 thus produced important changes in the ways in which 
Switzerland and Austria dealt with border-crossing flows and restrictions both during and after the 
event, on different geographical scales and for different reasons. 
 
4. FLEXIBLE BORDERS AT EURO 2008: THE INTER-STATE 
LEVEL 
The staging of Euro 2008 in an EU member state (Austria) and a non-EU country (Switzerland) 
raised important questions relating to the inter-state border between the two countries. Issues were 
further complicated by the fact that prior to Euro 2008, Switzerland had not yet implemented the 
EU Schengen agreement on European cross-border police cooperation. 
The specific border challenges arising from Switzerlandʼs political individualism were countered by 
a range of either pre-existing or specifically crafted arrangements with participating, neighbouring 
or transit countries (Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination UEFA EURO 2008 2007:17). 
For example, a temporary visa agreement was signed between the Schengen nations and 
Switzerland: whilst the border between Austria and Switzerland remained a border between an EU 
member state and a non-EU country (thus with border controls in place), no specific Swiss visa 
was required for fans from participating Schengen countries. This special arrangement also 
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included a temporary agreement for border controls to be manned by mixed teams of staff from 
both countries (Amies 2008; Klauser 2011c). 
In order to further investigate the logics and guiding principles of border control at Euro 2008 on the 
inter-state level, I propose to look in some detail at the following quote, taken from the final report 
on Euro 2008 in Switzerland (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand 2008a). The quote is long and 
relatively generalist in its tone, but it brings to the fore at least three main ambitions associated with 
border control at Euro 2008, including differential (1), mobile (2) and diffuse (3) control strategies 
and measures. Each of these deserves some discussion below. 
“The main purpose of the joint activities was to prevent potentially violent fans from entering 
or leaving the country. Emphasis was placed on the main traffic axes and delegated airports. 
Furthermore, the GWK [border guard corps] took part in the FRONTEX Joint Operation […] 
for the fight against illegal immigration at the external EU borders, and were involved in the 
collection of information through RAILPOL, the network of police forces for European rail. […] 
Border control authorities and customs – in coordination with the airport operators – offered 
facilitated arrival and departure conditions to teams, VIPs and officials. Shared standards 
were guaranteed through process instructions given to the airports, the “team liaison officers” 
and the “team security liaison officers”. International trains, (scheduled and extra trains) were 
assessed for specific risks by both the police and the train attendants, as well as by the GWK 
after crossing the border, and accompanied to their destinations. Between 7 and 29 June, the 
GWK prevented 149 illegal immigrations and implemented 702 refusals of entry at the 
border. 110 of these were due to an active travel ban, of which 12 were registered in the 
HOOGAN databases” (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand 2008a:43–44, my translation). 
 
4.1. Differential border control 
The quote portrays border control as an exercise of differentiation and categorisation of 
transnational flows of people and objects. Echoing Foucaultʼs understanding of the functioning of 
“security”, the stated objective of border control is to allow circulations to take place whilst 
differentiating, monitoring and regulating them. International mobilities are categorised into target 
groups and risk categories and then treated and monitored accordingly. Whilst “bad” (risky) 
travellers are singled out and stopped, based on international databases and police/intelligence 
collaboration, border crossings and circulations of “good” visitors are induced, facilitated and 
accelerated. The aim is to segregate “legitimate” mobilities, such as peaceful fans and official 
delegations, from “illegitimate” mobilities, such as hooligans, illegal immigrants and political 
activists.  
Of course, such differential control and treatment of international mobilities is neither new nor 
exclusive to sport mega-events. A growing body of work has in recent years highlighted the 
increasingly powerful, technology-based possibilities of tracking and differentiating international 
flows of people and objects, and the problems associated with these developments (Aas 2005:200; 
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Amoore 2008; Amoore, Marmura and Slater 2008:98). Thus extensive literatures show that such 
processes of ordering and (software-) sorting are never neutral. The deployed codes and 
databases constitute often invisible processes of classification and prioritization, which affect the 
life-chances of individuals or social groups in ways that are often opaque to the public and that 
easily evade conventional democratic scrutiny. The case of mega-event security presents at least 
three special qualities, which are further increasing this problem, in need of some discussion here. 
Firstly, it is important to note that to a large extent, the preferential treatment of particular visitor 
categories had already been requested at the pre-bidding stage by UEFA. As a pre-condition for 
their bid for Euro 2008, the Austrian and Swiss governments and football associations had to 
provide a series of guarantees relating to a wide range of issues. These included provision of event 
security, the protection of UEFAʼs commercial rights, granting visas/work permits, and the free 
importation of goods listed in UEFAʼs “Schedule of Conditions” (Projektorganisation Öffentliche 
Hand 2008a:100–105). From the very start of the bidding process for Euro 2008, UEFA ensured 
that official delegations (such as UEFA delegates, delegations of national teams, official UEFA 
partners, official LOC suppliers and media journalists) were provided with free visas and exempted 
of taxes linked to their professional activities in Switzerland. Thus, the differential treatment of 
international mobilities at Euro 2008 not only resulted from risk assessments and security 
considerations, but also responded to external stipulations, private interests and commercial 
rationales. In later parts of this paper, further imbrications between security and business interests 
will be explored, on other geographical scales. Together, these comments reiterate the need to 
problematise the often unquestioned public-private coalitions of interest and authority underpinning 
and shaping the differential treatment of social groups and individuals, with a view, most notably, to 
implied effects in terms of social justice and (positive or negative) social discrimination. 
The second special quality to highlight relates to what made differential border control possible in 
the first place; namely, increased possibilities of knowing, tracking and restricting border-crossing 
flows of people and objects, grounded in additional policing strategies and special surveillance 
measures. The temporary reintroduction of border control with neighbouring countries (i.e. with 
Schengen partners in the case of Europe) is perhaps the most tangible example at hand. 
Interestingly, this measure has now become a standard security strategy for major sport events: 
Portugal reintroduced border checks during the European Football Championships 2004, as did 
Finland during the 2005 World Championships in Athletics held in Helsinki. Yet for Euro 2008, 
border controls had to be reintroduced only in Austria. In Switzerland, since the EU Schengen 
agreement had not been implemented before Euro 2008, border controls were still in place and 
needed only to be increased and adapted to the specific needs and conditions of the event. 
Yet efforts towards differentially reinforced border control at Euro 2008 also relied on less tangible 
special measures, related to novel legislation and increased efforts in gathering, analysing and 
exchanging data. The above quote hints at the use of the RAILPOL information system and the 
international HOOGAN database, but many other examples could be provided. In Switzerland, for 
instance, special anti-hooligan legislation had been introduced before Euro 2008, offering much 
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increased autonomy to police for arresting and monitoring suspected hooligans. This also brought 
about novel possibilities for international collaboration and information exchange (Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft 2011). These examples reiterate powerfully that to understand the paths, 
processes and networks of the movements of persons, we also need to examine the paths, 
processes and networks of the movement of their personal data and information (Zureik and Salter 
2005:5; Aas 2005:197). Again, this issue is not exclusive to mega-event security, but the special 
conditions and measures deployed at mega-events add further importance to it. 
Thirdly, and in line with Foucaultʼs understanding of “security”, the example of border control and 
policing at sport mega-events also exemplifies powerfully the complex analytical framework and 
detailed calculations mediating the surveillance and filtering strategies focused at international 
mobilities. Austriaʼs final report of Euro 2008 provides a flavour thereof: 
“Border controls were temporary and only at certain border crossings of international and 
regional significance to Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary, 
depending on the countries competing on certain days, and expected supporter travel routes” 
(Republik Österreich 2008:97). 
Rather than a system of permanent and rigid constraints, we find a type of regulation that 
combines various event-related parameters and rationales, evaluates probabilities and then acts in 
differential and flexible ways, based on a series of analyses and special arrangements. The 
organisation and intensity of this differential and flexible type of border control depends on risk 
assessments at a given time, combined with a number of other relevant (economic and socio-
political) parameters whose relationship with the managed context of increased risk, density and 
visibility is carefully evaluated. A central challenge for future research into the power issues 
associated with security and border control at sport mega-events will thus be to undertake more 
detailed and fine-grain empirical investigations into the precise ways in which specific parameters 
and interests are coming together in this sophisticated “analytics of surveillance and regulation”. 
 
4.2. Mobile border control 
The quote taken from the final report on Euro 2008 in Switzerland also shows that by contrast with 
a mode of border control that focuses exclusively on specific points in space in order to monitor, 
limit and restrict transnational movements, border control at Euro 2008 was in itself mobile in 
space, for purposes of increased control and facilitated intervention. For example, trains 
transporting foreign fans considered “risky” were accompanied by border control guards. In the 
host cities, fan groups were monitored by police delegations and fan monitors from their own 
countries, and fan zones and other areas of increased fan concentrations were closely patrolled by 
local, national and foreign police, fan monitors and private security staff. 
Border control at Euro 2008 was thus integrated within a wider security scheme, bringing together 
a long chain of public and private actors, from border control guards and (foreign) police 
delegations to fan monitors and private security staff. The carefully coordinated actor network 
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offered a multi-scalar and – above all – mobile “dispositif” of surveillance (Foucault 2009:11) for 
accompanying and managing fan flows and activities “on the move”. Adapted to, and positively 
embracing, the monitored mobilities, this dispositif combined punctual access and passage 
controls with more linear and planar  logics of surveillance and regulation (where linear controls 
occur along transport routes and planar controls are in fan zones, around stadiums, etc.). 
 
4.3. Diffuse border control 
In highlighting the mobility of security and surveillance measures at Euro 2008, the quote also 
implicitly testifies to a third defining feature of border control at the event: the multiplicity of more or 
less mobile spatially dispersed control points for the management and filtering of national and 
international mobilities. Three examples help to further elucidate the spatial diffuseness of border 
control at Euro 2008. 
• For “registered” hooligans, border controls started in their very country of residence, with the 
imposition of travel restrictions or orders to report to the police before and during the 
tournament. Interestingly, we here find another policing measure, which has recently become 
best practice in event security: At the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, for example, more 
than 3,000 English fans were prevented from leaving the country. 
• According to the Final Report Euro 2008 in Austria, “in the course of the ʻJoint Operation 
EUROCUP 2008ʼ (JO), the FMI and the European Border Agency FRONTEX carried out a 
joint so-called HIO (High Impact Operation). While the EURO 2008 lasted, a total of 55 
Austrian officers served at the external borders (incl. embassies, airports and land borders, 
e.g. Poland-Ukraine), and 141 foreign officers served at Austrian land-borders and at 
international airports in support of the Austrian border control officers” (Republik Österreich 
2008:98). Swiss border guards also contributed to the same operation (Projektorganisation 
Öffentliche Hand 2008b:55), but no detailed information could be found regarding the number 
of officers serving at foreign borders.  
• The mobile fingerprint identification system, bought by the Swiss police from Motorola for Euro 
2008, provides a third example of the efforts towards increasingly diffuse (and mobile) border 
control1. As stated by Mark Hess, spokesperson for the Swiss Federal Police and quoted on 
Motorolaʼs Euro 2008 website, “Mobile AFIS enables us to operate quickly and discreetly in 
busy and crowded areas. Itʼs an ideal solution for targeted border control, helping to protect 
citizens and visitors. An event like EURO 2008, when our borders will be much busier than 
normal, is a good example of how much flexibility a mobile solution can provide” (Motorola 
                                                
1 Stationary biometric fingerprint ID devices have been employed by the Swiss Border Guard for many years. 
In 2005, for example, 18,000 prints were checked against the national policeʼs BIS database and over 5000 
positive identifications were made (Motorola undated:5). Yet at Euro 2008, these devices were deployed not 
only at border check points, but also within the event crowds. 
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2008:online). The quote bears striking testimony to current technologically mediated 
developments towards “ubiquitous borders” (Graham 2010; Lyon 2005), thus elucidating how 
novel technologies disrupt and delocalise territorial boundaries (Aas 2005:207). 
Together, the three examples cited above draw a clear picture of the “debordering process” at Euro 
2008. They imply an increased dissociation of border functions from the territorial frontiers (Albert 
and Brock 1996:62) and of the multi-scalar system of threat filters situated both outside (in the first 
and second examples) and within (in the case of mobile biometric fingerprint identification) the 
Swiss and Austrian national territories. Foreign fans, considered as risks, encountered the 
transnational border either in their private home (by being denied tickets or requested to report 
regularly to the police), on entry to the host countries, or in fan zones in the host cities (through 
police spot checks and biometric identification). This brings us to the internal spatial restructuring 
of the host cities of Euro 2008. 
 
5. MOBILE BORDERS AT EURO 2008: THE URBAN LEVEL 
Sport mega-events move from host city to host city (Hiller 2000). Their organisation and 
securitisation thus constitute primarily urban phenomena, even if their economic and social outputs 
are often expected to lie on a broader national or international scale (Klauser 2008). Unlike other 
mega-events such as the Olympics or G8 summits, Euro 2008 affected not only one urban site, but 
a network of eight host cities in two countries: Basel, Berne, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland; 
Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna in Austria. Using Euro 2008 as a case study thus 
offers ideal conditions for investigating how inter- and intra-urban spectator flows were channelled, 
secured and managed within the Swiss and Austrian city-network. This analysis will be structured 
below into three main parts, corresponding to three different functionalities of intra-urban access 
and passage controls: enclosing, channelling and following. 
 
5.1. Enclosing 
With the staging of sport mega-events, entire city centres are temporarily reconfigured as security 
landscapes. Euro 2008 made no exception to this: RentES, a company specialising in renting out 
fences for large-scale events, installed more than 30 kilometres of fences across six of the eight 
host cities of Euro 2008, demarcating a multitude of access-controlled spatial entities, from the 
stadiums to the referee headquarters and from team hotels to fan zones (RentES 2008:online). 
Border and access control, therefore, not only played a role on a national scale, but also occurred 
on an intra-city level. As shown elsewhere in more detail (Klauser 2008; 2010), the host cities of 
sport mega-events exemplify the splintering of the contemporary urban environment into a wide 
range of more or less hermetically enclosed and tightly controlled enclaves that are supported by 
advanced surveillance technologies and increased numbers of security personnel. 
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Perhaps the most obvious example at hand relates to the organisation of so-called “public viewing 
events”, i.e. specifically designed and enclosed “fan zones” where supporters of various nations 
could drink and party whilst watching the matches on giant television screens. Closely monitored 
by CCTV cameras, private security agents and police forces, these pre-defined perimeters for the 
concentration of fans also allowed the regulation of social life during the tournament. Access to fan 
zones was subject to sporadic spot checks and ID controls of suspect individuals. 
Easing the strain on the security forces in and around the stadia, fan zones during Euro 2008 
allowed the concentration, monitoring and regulation of fans within specifically designed, enclosed 
and secured perimeters across the host cities. Harbouring special norms and constraints, 
monitored by temporarily installed CCTV cameras and patrolled by public and private security 
agents, they enabled the policing of particular portions of space, whilst other urban areas remained 
less considered. Thus fan zones not only bear striking testimony to the event-related 
“festivalisation” of urban public space (Häussermann and Siebel 1993), but also provide an 
illuminating example of the separation, fencing and surveillance of extended parts of the host cities. 
During Euro 2008 the UEFA fan zone in Vienna, for example, covered more than 100,000m2 of the 
city centre and was surrounded by more than 4 kilometres of fencing (Vienna Organizing 
Committee EURO 2008 2008). Other host cities erected fencing around fan zones of similar 
proportions. Interestingly, the size and spatial disposition of fan zones were modified repeatedly to 
accommodate increasing numbers of fans, most notably in Berne, Switzerland (N24.de 2008). 
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Fan zone EURO 2008 on the Bundesplatz, Bern. Picture: FK 
 
Fan zone EURO 2008 on the Waisenhausplatz, Bern. Picture: FK 
 
A similar interpretation can be made of stadium security rings, as a second example of the 
translation of event security onto the level of urban territory in a context of increased density and 
risk. During Euro 2008, stadium security rings were placed up to several hundred metres from the 
stadium in each host city, forming the first fenced barrier to the stadium for arriving fan groups. 
Restricted to holders of match tickets (requiring ID-registration and thus allowing systematic 
identity controls), accredited staff, members of the press and other authorised persons, the 
compound area was closed to the general public for the duration of the tournament.  
 
Stadium Security Ring at Euro 2008, Bern. Picture: FK 
Both fan zones and stadium security rings can be understood as security elements for crowd 
monitoring and management (Klauser 2011b). They both bear material testimony to the internal 
fragmentation of the host cities into a patchwork of access-controlled and monitored spatial 
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entities. In both examples, access control aimed to guarantee the efficient functioning of separated, 
hierarchically organised parts of the urban environment through the control of the flows of people 
and objects crossing the line between the inside and the outside at particular points in space. In 
Foucaultʼs terms, access control here stands for a disciplinary logic of spatial intervention, which 
consists in selecting, classifying, subdividing, differentiating, arranging and controlling specific 
portions of space, without according the same type of attention to the whole urban territory. 
In addition to the securitisation of specific parts of the event cities, however, the structuring of 
space through fan zones and stadium security rings also served to temporarily re-territorialise 
particularly attractive parts of the Euro 2008 host cities in the interest of visibility and branding for 
UEFA and its commercial partners. As agreed in the Host City Charter, a legally binding agreement 
between the host cities and UEFA, the official event sponsors enjoyed exclusive branding rights in 
both UEFA fan zones and stadium security rings (as well as in other so-called “clean sites”) (UEFA 
undated:44). Each site had to be made available to UEFA free of any contractual obligations (such 
as leases, utilization agreements, supplier agreements, food, beverage agreements, and so forth) 
and pre-contracted advertising, in order to allow the siteʼs branding and commercial re-
territorialisation. The zones thus provide another powerful example for the intrinsic combination of 
security and business rationales associated with access and border control at Euro 2008. It is 
regrettable that the negotiations leading to the Host City Charter were agreed to remain secret and 
hence a priori excluded from public scrutiny (Regierungsrat Basel-Stadt 2007:50). 
 
5.2. Channelling 
Besides the official UEFA fan zones, each Euro 2008 host city also had a “fan mile” of two to four 
kilometres in length across the city centre. Closed to vehicle traffic during the tournament, yet not 
as hermetically fenced as the aforementioned “public viewing sites” in order to allow better access 
to local shops and restaurants, fan miles connected different fan sites, fan attractions, sponsorsʼ 
installations, etc. across each host city. As with the aforementioned public viewing sites, fan miles 
were highly monitored by private security staff and by national and international police forces. On 
those days where games were held in a particular host city, fan miles were yet further enlarged by 
a traffic-free, closely monitored and secured corridor, the “fan walk”, linking the cityʼs railway 
station to the relevant Euro 2008 stadium. Before and after games, flexible road barriers and check 
points for possible spectator controls were erected along these corridors (see pictures). 
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“Fan walk” EURO 2008, Bern. Picture: FK 
 
Flexible road barrier in Bern at Euro 2008. Picture: FK 
 
Flexible road barrier in Bern at Euro 2008. Picture: FK 
Thus the aim of access and passage controls at Euro 2008 was not only to secure specifically 
arranged and hierarchically organised parts of the urban environment, but also to channel fan flows 
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throughout the host cities. Small and larger portions of space were cut off and networked with the 
rest of the cities through a multitude of access or passage points, some controlled more tightly than 
others. The event city must be understood as an ensemble of filters and interlinked patterns of 
more or less detached and purified “insides” (Franzen 2001:207) and more or less controlled 
routes between these. What is emerging is a temporally limited, security-related form of “passage-
point urbanism” (Graham 2010). 
With a view to the mobile border issues explored in this paper, the emerging picture raises at least 
three main points to highlight. Firstly, the spatial and temporal flexibility and adaptability of the 
event-related system of access and passage points needs emphasising. Various components of 
the system (e.g. fan zone fences and police check points along fan miles) were constantly 
rearticulated and modified during the tournament; echoing the marketing slogan of RentES, 
“logistics just in time” (RentES undated:online), the regulatory control of the territory was adapted 
constantly to the changing characteristics of the event crowd. 
Secondly, the complex interplay of security agents, surveillance technologies and material objects 
is worth noting. Efforts towards mobile borders rely on a complex and dynamic assemblage of 
people, technologies and objects, such as fences, police cars used as road blocks, CCTV 
cameras, etc., which is constantly renegotiated and adapted to specific needs and conditions. 
Thirdly, the examples quoted in this paper also demonstrate that the relationship between the 
spatialities of “discipline” and “security”, in Foucaultʼs terminology, is not one of opposition; rather, 
the two are closely interlinked, complementing and supporting each other. The study of Euro 2008 
exemplifies the intertwined logics of fixing, enclosing and delimiting space on the one hand, and of 
regulating and managing circulations on the other. 
 
5.3. Following 
Despite the flexibility and mobility of the measures described so far, fences cannot be repositioned 
and extended infinitely and police road blocks only make sense in certain conditions and on certain 
routes. In order to follow moving fans more freely throughout the Euro 2008 host cities, other 
technology-based solutions came into play. 
As noted previously, mobile fingerprint identification devices enabled mobile border control 
throughout the urban environment. Yet they did not allow the monitoring of large fan groups. For 
this purpose, the police used mobile CCTV cameras - tellingly named “taktisches Fernsehen” 
(Stadionwelt and dpa 2006:online) - as well as spotters and plainclothes officers alongside and 
within the moving fan groups, and helicopters and drones above the event cities (Stadtpolizei 
Zürich 2007). 
Since 2005, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been used in Switzerland for monitoring traffic, 
natural disasters and national borders. Yet the policing of Euro 2008 marked the first urban-centred 
UAV application in the country, thus also providing indirect evidence of the limits of surveillance 
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dispositifs anchored on the ground, and reiterating the need for unhindered, mobile and flexible 
monitoring techniques for crowd control. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, border control at Euro 2008 has been portrayed as part of a much wider security 
scheme, building up a complex assemblage of more or less mobile, diffuse and adaptable control 
points and techniques. These techniques are based on many different measures, from travel bans 
to security rings around stadia and other fenced zones, from mobile fingerprint identification 
devices to renegotiated visa agreements and extended international police collaboration, from the 
surveillance of fan groups on trains to the deployment of drones above the host cities. Following 
the need to monitor, filter and, if necessary, restrict and confine international, intra-national and 
intra-urban flows of people and objects, these techniques also work on many different international, 
national and local scales. 
Following Foucaultʼs distinction between apparatuses of “security” and “discipline”, the paper has 
argued that at their very core, these security efforts combine two spatial and functional logics. On 
the one hand, there is the need to enclose and to “discipline” particular portions of the event 
territory (stadium security rings, fan zones, buildings). In this disciplinary form of spatial 
intervention, the urban environment is fragmented into a number of hierarchically organised 
enclosures, which are subjected to rigid stipulations and intense control. Within these fixed, 
separated and isolated enclaves, surveillance and normalisation follow a planar spatial logic, 
aiming at the complete control and “disciplination” of the whole enclosed compound, following a 
binary opposition between the allowed and the forbidden. 
On the other hand, there is the fundamental need to keep the host nations and the event cities 
open, resulting in a range of efforts and techniques aiming at differentiating and managing different 
types of circulations. Regulation and surveillance in this second “economy of power” are not based 
on enclosure and fixity for the majority of the travellers and visitors, but on a range of techniques 
aimed at “organizing circulation, eliminating its “unwanted elements”, making a division between 
“good” and “bad” circulation, and maximizing the “good” circulation by diminishing the “bad” 
(Foucault 2009:18). 
What emerges hence is a “programme of government of movement” (Côté-Boucher 2008), aiming 
to establish and monitor routes and passage points for channelling, tracking, monitoring, facilitating 
and accelerating different lines and types of circulation, from point to point, from zone to zone. Yet, 
as argued, such processes of ordering circulations (through privileging and restricting) are neither 
neutral nor unproblematic. Rather, they raise a series of critical power issues that are often opaque 
to the public and that easily evade conventional democratic scrutiny. This problematic is of 
particular importance if, as I have shown through multiple examples, the differential treatments of 
international mobilities not only result from risk assessments and security considerations, but also 
respond to external stipulations, private interests and commercial rationales. 
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6.1. Intertwined linkages of “discipline” and “security” 
Whilst “discipline” and “security”, in Foucaultʼs terminology, offer a worthwhile analytical lens to 
emphasise different spatially articulated functions of security governance, it would be wrong to 
understand their logics and “economies of power” as strictly opposed. Rather, they must be 
understood as fundamentally intertwined and mutually supportive. There are at least two main 
reasons for this, which are both valid in general, but even more so in the context of the increased 
density, diversity and visibility of sport mega-events. 
First, the intrinsic combination of “discipline” and “security” is simply a result of scale. Discipline 
typically focuses on very specific zones and clearly circumscribed “insides”, in which its 
mechanisms of power aim to function fully and without limit (Foucault 2009:45). The increased 
density and diversity at sport mega-events, located within a transnational space of circulation, 
cannot be managed merely through a series of specifically arranged spatial enclosures, but 
requires a spatial logic of control for the monitoring and regulation of more extensive scales and 
densities of circulation across the host nations and cities. 
Second, the intertwined combination of “discipline” and “security” is also related to the 
functionalities and inherent objectives of sport mega-events. Aimed at attracting the attention of 
visitors, athletes, tourists, etc. – and thus often legitimised politically in terms of “urban 
entrepreneurialism” and “place selling” (Hall and Hubbard 1998; Kearns and Philo 1993) – sport 
mega-events, to a certain extent at least, imply values such as openness and joyfulness2. Thus 
policing and control at sport mega-events cannot be based exclusively on a strict logic of enclosure 
and “discipline”. The fact that UEFA produced more than 15 kilometres of tarpaulin to camouflage 
the most prominently positioned fences across the eight host cities of the event provides 
symptomatic expression thereof (UEFA 2008): Whilst fences were in reality omnipresent, pictures 
of fortified city squares had to be avoided. 
Whilst security governance at sport mega-events is shaped by the intertwined (spatial and 
functional) logics of “discipline” and “security”, a very similar problem can of course also be seen in 
current processes of globalisation more generally. For contemporary governments, the core 
requirements of freely circulating people and objects for sustaining the liberalist economic system 
mix uncomfortably with reflexes towards reinforced enclosures, border controls and access 
restrictions. By pointing at the interface and actual combination of the two apparently opposed 
ambitions, and by highlighting the problems associated with the resulting efforts towards increased 
social sorting and differentiation of apparently “good” and “bad” circulations, the present analysis is 
                                                
2 This is perhaps the most important difference for security governance between sport mega-events and 
political summits such as G8 meeting or economic forums. However, as Samatas argues with a view to the 
2004 Athens and 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (Samatas 2011), there can also be important differences 
between sport events staged in different national contexts. 
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at its most generalist value. In this focus, the paper powerfully exemplifies the critical, yet often 
problematic combination of enclosure and mobility, “security” and “discipline”, which is shaping our 
contemporary world. 
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